tion in employment specifically provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application pro cedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."9 The ADA also specifies, in a seven part description, the types of behavior that constitute discrimina tion against an individual with a disab ili t y .10
Congress failed, however, to state with the same specificity what constitutes a disability in the first place; instead, the Act broadly defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that sub stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] indi vidual."11 Infertile individuals seeking ADA protection have argued that their impairments constitute ADA-protected disabili ties because they "substantially limit" the "major life activity" of reproduction.12
The question of whether infertilit y fits within this broad defini tion of disability is complicated by the fact that infertility is not al- ways a medically distinct impairment. Rather, a variety of disorders may cause infertility, and many of these disorders affect activities other than reproduction.13 An ovarian tumor or a sexually trans mitted disease, for example, can cause infertility, but these condi tions can also limit participation in other activities. An ovarian tumor may limit a woman's ability to walk, and gonorrhea can cause blindness.14 For purposes of this Note, disorders affecting previously recognized "major life activities"15 and reproduction must be distinguished from disorders that affect only reproduction.
This Note terms disorders that affect reproduction, but no other previously recognized major life activities, as purely reproductive disorders. This Note focuses only on the applicability of the ADA to purely reproductive disorders.16
Courts are divided as to whether purely reproductive disorders may constitute disabilities. Litigants generally agree that purely re productive disorders are "impairments" that "substantially limit" the activity of reproduction.17 The crux of the legal dispute, there fore, is whether reproduction itself constitutes a "major life activ ity" under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit has held that sterile individuals may be handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 18 a statute upon which the ADA based its definition of disa bility.19 Following this holding, district courts within that circuit have held that infertile individuals and those with reproductive dis orders that jeopardize a pregnancy are disabled under the ADA. These courts have based their holdings on a finding that reproduc tion is a major life activity.20 Other courts, in an effort to justify 13. See generally TAYMOR, supra note 2, at 21-41 (discussing various factors that contrib ute to infertility in men and women). 15. The major life activities explicitly recognized by Congress or the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, or both, are as follows: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, sitting, standing, lift ing, reaching, thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others. For a discussion and brief legal history of the recognition of these activities as major life activities under the Act, see infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
16. This Note declines to consider reproductive disorders that affect other major life ac tivities because these reproductive disorders are clearly covered by the ADA and are there fore uncontroversial. ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV-positive21 individuals, have also classified reproduction as a major life activity.22 Outside of the Seventh Circuit, however, no court evaluating ADA coverage of purely reproductive disorders has classified reproduction as a major life activity. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have both held that in fertile individuals are not protected by the ADA because reproduc tion is not a major life activity.23
This Note argues that purely reproductive disorders do not con stitute disabilities under the ADA. Part I examines the statutory language and interpretive guidelines24 that determine whether an impairment qualifies as a disability and concludes that it would be improper to interpret such language as covering purely reproduc tive disorders. Part II analyzes the legislative history of the Act and maintains that Congress did not intend to include purely reproduc tive disorders within the definition of disability. Part III identifies three characteristics common to all of the major life activities al ready recognized under the ADA and argues that because repro duction lacks these characteristics, i,t should not be recognized as a major life activity.25 Part IV contends that victims of discrimination may obtain relief through other, more appropriate legal avenues, making their reliance on the ADA unnecessary.
21. "HIV" is the abbreviation for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, which causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 25. Although individuals with purely reproductive disorders do not suffer from an "im pairment that substantially limits one or more .. . major life activities," they may nonetheless be eligible for ADA protection under the Act's "second definition" or "third definition." The ADA provides "second definition" and "third definition" ADA protection, respectively, to individuals who have a "record of' or are "regarded as" having a disability. Such coverage is available, however, only if the perceived disability includes, or is perceived to include, the components of a physical or mental impairment, substantial limitation, and major life activ ity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (C) (1994). As a result, an employee can be "disabled" under the ADA's third definition if her employer regards her to be substantially limited in a major life activity, even if, in reality, she is not limited at all. For a more complete discussion of third definition coverage, see infra note 141. This Note will limit its analysis to whether an individual with a purely reproductive disorder actually has a disability, that is, whether such an individual would qualify under the first definition. Nonetheless, because the concepts of "impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activity" are relevant to all three defini tions, the conclusions that follow may have the effect of limiting disability coverage under the second and third definitions as well.
I. PURELY REPRODUCTIVE DISORDERS FAIL TO MEET THE
ADA's THREE-PART DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
To qualify for coverage under the ADA, a disorder must satisfy the three necessary elements set out in the Act's definition of "disa bility": (a) a "physical or mental impairment" that (b) "substan tially limits" (c) a "major life activit [y] ."26 Defendants in cases involving infertility often concede the presence of the first two com ponents, admitting that the plaintiffs' reproductive disorder is an impairment that substantially limits the ability to reproduce.27 In stead, they contest the applicability of the third component, arguing that reproduction is not a "major life activity" under the Act.28 Some courts, however, have confused the debate by treating the first factor, impairment, as the sole determinant of disability status. This Part argues that courts following this approach misread the Act.
Despite the statute's three essential components, some courts wrongly have used the definition of "impairment" as their defini tion of "disability," thus ignoring the statutory requirement that the impairment "substantially limit" a "major life activity" in order to 26 . See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining a disability as "a physical or mental impair ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] Although the ADA does not define "impairment," Congress delegated the authority to define this component to the administrative agencies in charge of enforcing the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § § 12116-12117 (granting the EEOC authority to enforce Title I: Employment); 42 U.S.C. § § 12134, 12186(b) (1994) (granting the Department of Justice authority to enforce Title II: Public Services, part A, and Title ID: Public Accommodations and Services Oper ated by Private Entities). These agencies have defined broadly the phrase "physical or mental impairment" in a manner that clearly includes physiological disorders or conditions affecting the reproductive system: Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe cial sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. This analysis, however, is fatally flawed because it ignores criti cal statutory language, thereby subverting Congress's intent to de fine the scope of ADA coverage based on the severity of an impairment rather than its type. The ADA's mechanism for limit ing the scope of its coverage lies in the "substantially limiting" and "major life activities" components -not in the list of examples of conditions that satisfy the "impairment" component. Congress and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have clearly stated that the presence of an impairment alone is not suffi cient to merit protection under the Act.32 In recommending pas sage of the ADA, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the House Educa tion and Labor Committee agreed that an impairment does not constitute a disability unless its severity is such that it substantially limits one or more "major life activities."33 For example, a person with a "minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger is not impaired in a major life activity."34 Similarly, the EEOC de votes a full section of its ADA compliance manual to interpretation of the term "substantially limiting," differentiating between impair ments that substantially limit major life activities -and therefore constitute "disabilities" -and those that do not.3s
By recognizing a range of impairments broader than the range of major life activities that may be impaired, the ADA defines its scope of protection based on the severity of an impairment, not merely on its type.36 Correspondingly, Congress and the EEOC in- The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for partic ular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling [,] to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments.").
The ADA establishes no automatic categorical relationship be tween recognized impairments and recognized major life activities.
The Pacourek court reasons that because the EEOC lists reproduc tive disorders as a type of impairment, it must have intended repro duction to be considered a major life activity.42 Most of the categories of impairment on the Congressional and EEOC lists,43 however, lack corresponding major life activities. Sickle-cell ane mia, for example, is a hemic disorder constituting an impairment, but the ability to produce normal-shaped blood cells is not a major life activity. Rather, the determination as to whether an individual with sickle cell anemia is disabled depends on the effect of that im pairment on some other life activity, such as the ability to walk.44
The inclusion of reproductive disorders in the list of example impairments signifies only a recognition that reproductive disorders may be serious enough to warrant ADA protection, not an ac knowledgment that all reproductive disorders automatically sub stantially limit a major life activity. The legislative history of the ADA does not indicate that Con gress intended the ADA to include protection for individuals with purely reproductive disorders. Legislators did recognize that repro ductive disorders generally -that is, not only purely reproductive disorders -were "impairments" that could substantially limit ma jor life activities.48 Yet in the entirety of hearings, floor debates, and committee reports, no legislator ever referred to any purely re productive disorder as the type of condition that would substan tially limit any major life activity and that therefore should qualify under the ADA as a disability.49
Although nothing in the legislative history advocates recogniz ing purely reproductive disorders as disabilities, the legislative his tory does include explicit and universal recognition that all individuals infected with IDV qualify as disabled.50 One legislative committee expressed a belief that substantial limitations on the ability of IDV-infected individuals to reproduce provide the basis for universal coverage of IDV, thereby implying that reproduction is a major life activity.51 The courts that have recognized infertility as a disability have relied heavily on these comments about IDV as support for their conclusion that reproduction constitutes a major life activity.52
Section II.A asserts that it is improper to extrapolate from ADA coverage of IDV-positive individuals that the ADA also covers in dividuals with purely reproductive disorders. In fact, as section II.B points out, legislators consciously excluded reproduction from their a major life activity. Section II.A.2 argues that Congress instead adopted what can be called the one-disease view, which justifies ADA coverage on the basis that the full course of HIV, from infec tion to the onset and development of AIDS, is one disease that in evitably and invariably affects nonreproductive major life activities. Tiris section concludes that ADA coverage of HIV fails to support the claim that reproduction is a major life activity. Second, although the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources both cite the Kmiec Memorandum, they do so only for its conclusion, making no reference to reproduction as a major life activity.65 These com mittee reports also exclude reproduction from their lists of major life activities.
Third, if Congress intended universal HIV coverage to be based on limitations to reproduction, there likely would have been addi tional discussion on the floor or in committee reports on other re productive disorders that the ADA would automatically classify as disabilities. In the entirety of legislative floor debates and commit tee reports, there was no discussion of the ADA's intended effect on any purely reproductive disorders. There is no evidence that Congress ever contemplated that the ADA would classify individu als with purely reproductive disorders as disabled.
The most compelling evidence, however, that Congress did not intend reproductive limitations to provide the justification for uni versal HIV coverage is that this justification cannot fully explain universal HIV coverage. HIV infection does not affect the activity of reproduction for every HIV-positive individual. Consequently, the dual assertions that HIV substantially limits re production and that reproduction is a major life activity cannot sat isfactorily explain universal ADA coverage of HIV-infected individuals.
Another argument that should not be overlooked is that HIV is primarily a disorder of the immune system and does not necessarily limit the physical ability to reproduce at all. HIV-positive individu als often choose not to reproduce because of the risk that HIV will be transmitted to the child or that pregnancy may trigger or acceler ate the onset of a more active stage of AIDS.68 Nonetheless, many individuals with HIV can reproduce, and many who do reproduce will have children who are HIV-negative. 69 The fact that some HIV-positive individuals can and do reproduce indicates that HIV infection does not necessarily substantially limit its carriers' ability to reproduce. To the extent that HIV infection does not limit the reproductive capabilities, limitations on reproduction cannot be the reason why all HIV-positive individuals are considered disabled. 69. See id. at 1423-24 (stating that only one in three babies born to HIV-positive women will be born with the virus). For further analysis of whether the psychological aversion to sexual activity resulting from fear of spreading the virus can be considered "substantially limiting," see id. at 1421-28.
which progresses through a variable range of stages."70 As it pro gresses toward full -blown AIDS, HIV invariably limits almost all of the explicitly recognized major life activities.11 The one-disease theory not only represents the prevailing view of the medical com munity ,12 but also represents the approach of the Presidential Com mission on HIV73 as well as the predominant view among the legislators who passed the ADA.74 Various courts have followed this lead and have adopted the one-disease explanation as well.75
The one-disease theory is also more consistent with the ADA's antidiscriminatory purpose. Because AIDS is a progressive disease, HIV infection will at some point substantially limit major life activi ties, even though it may not be known when that will occur -or, once it has occurred, when it began.76 Because there is no clear demarcation indicating the onset of the inevitable substantially lim iting stage of the disease, it is unrealistic to attempt to diff erentiate between the disabling and predisabling stages of the disease. ployer might be encouraged to discriminate against an HIV-positive employee in the early stages of the disease -before the HIV progressed to the point at which it would substantially limit major life activities.78 By protecting all HIV-positive individuals at all stages of the disease, the ADA avoids creating such an incentive for employers to discriminate in the early stages of HIV, before it is "too late." As a result, HIV-positive individuals at any stage of the disease should be treated as sharing the characteristics of those with more clinically advanced AIDS and, accordingly, as having an im pairment that substantially limits major life activities.
The one-disease theory, therefore, provides the soundest and Although none of these lists of major life activities purports to be exhaustive, the failure to include reproduction is not likely to have been mere oversight. First, legislative references to the Kmiec memorandum at least raise the possibility that some members of Congress believed that the ADA's coverage of HIV stemmed from limitations on reproduction.82 In light of these references in the legislative history, the decisions of the various Congressional com mittees, the EEOC, and the Department of Justice to exclude re production from their lists of major life activities provide powerful evidence that any push to include reproduction as an acknowledged major life activity was a minority effort. Second, Congress, the EEOC, and the Department of Justice clearly contemplated the role of reproductive disorders in the Act's definitional scheme be cause reproductive disorders are included in every list of sample impairments. 83 Had Congress intended to include reproduction among major life activities, it certainly had the opportunity to do so. The inclusion of reproductive disorders among impairments and the simultaneous exclusion of reproduction as a named major life activity strongly suggest that Congress did not intend reproduc tion to constitute a major life activity. Finally, the only legislator even to address the role of purely reproductive disorders under the ADA concluded that such disorders should not constitute auto matic disabilities.84 The only conclusion that can be drawn from the part of the legislative history that suggests that some members of Congress believed reproduction to be a major life activity is that some members of Congress believed reproduction to be a major life activity.85
Neither the ADA itself nor the EEOC's interpretive guidelines define the phrase "major life activity." Instead, the EEOC merely offers examples of functions that constitute major life activities, fur ther cautioning that this list is not exhaustive.86 Additionally, the EEOC provides only vague guidelines for determining whether an unlisted activity should qualify.87 This Part examines the statutory and administrative guidelines that define which types of activities constitute "major life activities" and concludes that reproduction falls outside these guidelines. Section ID.A argues that three char acteristics -microfrequency, macrofrequency, and universalityare common to all previously recognized major life activities and should be explicitly recognized as necessary elements of a major life activity. Section ID.B concludes that in terms of microfrequency, macrofrequency, and universality, reproduction is qualitatively dif ferent from previously recognized major life activities. As a result, reproduction cannot be considered a major life activity under the ADA. Purely reproductive disorders, therefore, do not substan tially limit a major life activity and are not disabilities under the ADA.
A. The Frequency-Universality Test Identifies Three Necessary Elements of a Major Life Activity
Although no clear statutory or administrative mandate defines the necessary components of a major life activity, the EEOC has provided some guidance by expressly recognizing sixteen activities as major life activities. Nine of these activities are codified in the federal regulations, four appear in the appendix to the codified reg ulations, and three appear in the EEOC Compliance Manual. Ac cording to federal regulations, major life activities include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work ing."88 This codified list matches the lists of major life activities promulgated in the House and Senate Committee Reports recom mending passage of the bill.89 In an appendix to this list, the EEOC also includes sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching among major life activities. Although neither the EEOC nor Congress provides criteria nec essary for identifying a major life activity, the major life activities they have already recognized share three common characteristics. Explicit recognition of these characteristics as necessary compo nents of a major life activity would provide the courts with much needed guidance, limiting conflicts among jurisdictions and provid ing increased predictability in ADA enforcement. As a result, this Note advocates the express recognition of the following three element Frequency-Universality Te st. 94 To merit consideration as a major life activity under this test, an activity must be performed:
(1) with microfrequency: repeatedly throughout the day, if the activity is brief in duration, or for a large portion of the day, if the activity is of longer duration;
(2) with macrofrequency: every day or nearly every day;95 and 1143 (5th Cir. 1996). The test tightens the "throughout the day, day in and day out" language from these decisions and recasts them in terms of microfrequency and macrofrequency. The universality element is adapted from a footnote in Kra uel that observes: "Some people choose not to have children, but all people care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, breathe, learn, and work, unless a handicap or illness prevents them from doing so." Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 n.1.
95. "Nearly every day" means nearly every day, not three or four times a week. "Nearly"
is used only to acknowledge that there may be unusual or rare circumstances in which some one without an impairment would not perform a major life activity for a day. For example, the fact that someone without an impairment might choose not to speak for one full day would not foreclose a showing of macrofrequency. One commentator argued against the adoption of a frequency criterion, claiming, "Although it is certainly true that most people engage in the activities of walking and breath ing more frequently than they engage in reproduction, the same cannot be said of other activities on the list, such as manual tasks or caring for others." Katie Cook Morgan, Com ment, Sh ould Infertility Be a Covered Disability Un der the ADA?: A Question fo r Congress, Not the Courts, 65 CIN. L. REv. 963, 981 (1997). The argument that most people reproduce more frequently than they perform manual tasks or care for others may be true in some brothels but certainly nowhere else. "Manual taks," by definition, include any tasks per formed with the hands. Without question, people not disabled use their hands many times throughout the day, every day. "Manual tasks," by definition, include any tasks performed with the hands. Without question, people not disabled use their hands many times through out the day, every day. "Caring for others" is not even an enumerated major life activity. The author apparently confuses this activity with the enumerated major life activities of "car ing for oneself' and "interacting with others." It would strain credibility to argue that people do not care for themselves or interact with others repeatedly throughout the day, every day or nearly every day.
(3) universally: by nearly all persons, except those who are pre vented from performing the activity by an AD A-defined "impairment. "96
All of the sixteen previously recognized major life activitieswith the exception of "working," which is discussed immediately below -satisfy these three threshold criteria. This Note does not address whether these three criteria are sufficient for qualification as a major life activity. This Note merely argues that the three ele ments of the Frequency-Universality Test are necessary prerequi sites for qualification as a major life activity.
Working does not fit the Frequency-Universality Test, but Con gress and the EEOC have clearly indicated their intent that work ing be treated differently from the other major life activities. Unlike their treatment of the other listed activities, Congress and the EEOC have established specific criteria for courts to consider in determining whether an impairment substantially limits the activity of working.97 Congress and the EEOC specifically call for courts, to evaluate separately limitations on working because these limita tions are inherently more difficult to define.98 Congress further 96. Again, "nearly" is used to acknowledge that there are rare and unusual circumstances in which some people would not participate in a major life activity on a certain day. For example, someone hiking alone in the mountains might not speak for a day, or a prisoner tied down might not stand for a day. However, these events are irrelevant in terms of the ADA's purpose of providing legal protection to disabled individuals who are denied equal participa· tion in American society. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a){2), (7), {8) {1994) (identifying as impe tuses to passage of the ADA Congress's findings that "society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities," that discrimination against individuals with disabili ties denies them the ability to "participate in, and contribute to, society," and that "the Na tion's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities" include the assurance of "full participation" in society); see also 136 CoNG. REc. 10,872 {May 17, 1990) (remarks of Rep.
We iss) {"The ADA ... is long overdue legislation remedying the separatism which now excludes 43 million disabled citizens from equal participation in American society."). This statutory purpose presupposes that the individuals the Act aims to protect engage in a certain minimal level of normal social interaction. Tue existence of a few extreme or unusual counterfactual examples of people isolated from society will not foreclose a showing of universality, precisely because neither the Act nor the universality element is meant to pro tect individuals isolated from the general population.
Interpretive guidance provided by the EEOC supports the use of a "nearly all people" standard instead of a standard purporting to account for "all people." Tue little difficulty evinced its intent to provide special protection to those who partici pate in the activity of working by enacting Title I of the ADA, which specifically targets discrimination in employment.99 None of the other fifteen recognized major life activities is given such unique and explicit emphasis in the ADA, and each of these re maining fifteen recognized major life. actitjties are performed microfrequently, macrofreque;ntly, and universally.
Although no jurisdiction has explicitly adopted this Frequency Universality Te st, numerous courts have employed its elements in making determinations regarding ADA coverage.100 These courts have refused to recognize as a major life activity any function that lacks any of the three components of the test. For example, courts have held that participation in recreational sports is not a major life activity.1°1 Participation in sports fails the test because not all peo ple participate in sports. Although some people -professional athletes, for example -may participate in sports for a large por tion of the day, every day, participation in sports must fail the universality test because unimpaired people commonly choose not to participate in sports.102 Similarly, air travel has been held not to constitute a major life activity because people do not engage in air travel with the same frequency or universality with which they en gage in the expressly recognized major life activities.103 Like partic ipation in sports, air travel fails the test. can involve learning how to a be part of a team, but that the plaintiff 's inability to play on the team did not substantially limit his ability to learn because a myriad of educational opportu nities remained available at the plaintiff 's college); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assn., 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The fact that interscholastic sports are not per formed by everybody every day means only that interscholastic sports cannot constitute a major life activity per se; the courts that have considered the inability to participate in inter scholastic sports a disability have done so only when they have also concluded that the inabil ity to participate substantially limited the plaintiff 's ability to learn in general. See, e.g., Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 489 (finding that because participation on the track team helped the plaintiff retain the discipline he needed in order to study more effectively in school, the plaintiff 's inability to participate substantially limited his ability to learn).
102. See Knapp, 101 F.3d 473, 480 (pointing out that universality is absent, as "[n]ot eve ryone gets to go to college, let alone play intercollegiate sports"). On the other hand, courts uniformly have accepted sleep as a major life activity.104 Sleep satisfies all three elements. It satisfies the microfrequency element because it is performed for several hours a day; the macrofrequency element because it is performed every day -or at least nearly every day, if we acknowledge the occasional all-nighter; and the universality element because it is performed by all people. Similarly, courts have found eating to be a major life activity.105 Eating satisfies the microfrequency element because it is performed repeatedly throughout the day; the macrofrequency element because it is performed every day or nearly every day; and the universality element because it is per formed by all people.
B. Reproduction Lacks the Necessary Ch aracteristics of a Major Life Activity lbis section considers three approaches courts have taken in evaluating reproduction as a purported major life activity and ex amines how these approaches relate to the Frequency-Universality Test. As section ID.B.1 elaborates, some courts implicitly have adopted all three components of the test as minimally necessary cri teria for a major life activity and have concluded that reproduction does not satisfy these criteria. Other courts, described in section m.B.2, implicitly have adopted the frequency components106 of the test and have attempted to redefine reproduction in terms of more frequent events like ovulation and sperm production so that it meets the microfrequency and macrofrequency criteria. Finally, section III.B.3 explains how some courts have rejected the fre quency components as too narrowly drawn, instead holding that re production should be a major life activity because of its momentousness as a lifetime event. lbis section concludes that only the first of these three approaches preserves the proper mean ing of the statute. § 12926(k)(l) (West 1994) (defining disability); CAL. CODE REos. tit. 2, § 7293.6 (1994) (de fining major life activity). 106. The "frequency components" are microfrequency and macrofrequency. These courts were silent as to the universality element.
Courts in at least two jurisdictions implicitly have applied the criteria of the Frequency-Universality Te st to reject reproduction as a major life activity.1 0 7 Only this approach effectively preserves the language of the statute without judicially enlarging the scope of a "major life activity" as set forth by Congress and the EEOC. Li ke air travel or participation in sports, reproduction is an activity quali tatively different from the other activities on the EEOC list. In sharp contrast to the frequency with which people care for them selves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, and learn, reproduction does not occur every day or nearly every day, nor repeatedly throughout the day or for a large portion of the day.1 os Most individuals who reproduce do so only a few times in their lives; the human gestation period places physical restraints on the frequency with which people can reproduce. Absent a multiple birth, a person simply cannot reproduce on more than one or two occasions per year. A far cry from "nearly every day," a full nine months must pass between complete and successful reproductive ventures.1°9 Noting the infrequency of reproduction relative to the previously recognized major life activities, the court in Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center observed that "a person is not called upon to reproduce throughout the day, every day."110 In fact, most courts that have found reproduction to be a major life activity have conceded that reproduction lacks the frequency ele ments that help comprise the test. They instead justify classification of reproduction as a major life activity by rejecting the test.111
107. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-07 & n.1 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (applying the frequency components by pointing out that people do not reproduce "throughout the day, day in and day out "; also applying the universality component by con trasting reproduction, an activity in which some people choose not to engage, with walking, seeing, and other activities, which are performed by all unimpaired people), affd. , 95 F.3d 674 {8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) {applying the frequency components by pointing out that, unlike the frequency with which people participate in previously recognized major life activities, people do not reproduce "throughout the day, day in and day out "), affd. , 79 F.3d 1143 {5th Cir. 1996). 111. See infra section III.B.3 {describing the approach of courts that reject the frequency criteria and embrace reproduction as a major life activity). But cf. section III.B.2 (describing the approach of courts that adopt the frequency criteria but attempt to redefine reproduction in terms of more frequent events so that reproduction fits within the frequency criteria).
Reproduction also fails to satisfy the universality component of the test. Unlike every illustrative major life activity set forth by Congress and the EEOC,11 2 reproduction is a lifestyle choice be cause many people consciously decline to participate in this activity, even though they have no impairment that prevents their participa tion. In contrast, activities that are performed universally are per formed by nearly all people, unless an impairment prevents their participation.
Some courts that classify reproduction as a major life activity reject the notion that reproduction is a lifestyle choice. Instead, these courts call reproduction "an integral part of life," noting that without it, "none of us, nor any living thing, would exist."113 This argument, though it may have a certain sentimental appeal, ignores the common elements shared by previously recognized major life activities. All members of society care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, and learn unless an impairment prevents them from doing so.114 Many people, on the other hand, choose not to have children, despite having the capabil ity to reproduce in a healthy manner.
Another court held that to call reproduction a lifestyle choice was nothing more than an exercise in semantics because certain other major life activities -speaking, for example -are choices as well.115 It is certainly true that some of the previously recognized major life activities have a volitional element, but it is also irrele vant. The argument that reproduction is a lifestyle choice does not fail merely because other recognized major life activities are voli tional. There is still a universe of difference between the number of people that speak and the number that reproduce. Speaking is an activity engaged in by all or nearly all people, unless an impairment prevents them from doing so. Unlike the other previously recog nized majc;>r life activities, many people capable of reproducing sim ply choose not to reproduce.116 The difference is qualitative, not merely quantitative. The previously recognized major life activities share the characteristic of being performed by nearly every unimpaired person on the planet. The activity of reproduction does not share that quality.
Not only is reproduction a lifestyle choice that many people consciously decline, but · those who attempt or desire it often en-112. Wo rking, to which Congress gave special attention, is a unique, rather than an illus- counter significant difficulties. According to the interpretive guide lines to the ADA, "'major life activities' are those basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty."117 It can hardly be said that the average per son in the general population can reproduce with little or no diffi culty; many people are too young to reproduce, and many women are too old. Age, however, is not an automatic physical impedi ment to performing any of the major life activities the EEOC has explicitly recognized. The fact that a significant number of people are physically incapable of reproducing makes reproduction differ ent from every previously acknowledged major life activity. Fur ther, many people are neither too young nor too old to reproduce, but lack a partner.118 Finally, many people who have a partner fail to reproduce when they have heterosexual intercourse simply be cause of the odds against conception, even by a male and female with no reproductive impairments.119 Because it fails both the Frequency-Universality Te st and the little difficulty standard, repro duction lacks the characteristics common to the other major life ac tivities, and judges therefore should not add it to the list.
Ju dicial Approach 2: Adop t the Fr equency Components, and Tr y to Make Reproduction Fit
Some courts classifying reproduction as a major life activity have not rejected the frequency components embraced by the test; rather they have attempted to squeeze the square peg of reproduc tion into the round holes of micro-and macrofrequency by redefin ing reproduction in terms of more frequent events.12° Courts in jurisdictions following this "redefining" approach have dealt with the frequency component by contending that reproduction should not be viewed in terms of conception and childbirth alone. Rather, they argue, reproduction should be evaluated in terms of "the processes that occur continually in both male and female reproduc- 118. Artificial insemination may solve this problem, but this complicated and expensive ordeal can hardly be characterized as something the "average person in the general population" can do "with little or no diffi culty." ' 119. The monthly fecundity (conception rate) in normal couples ranges from approxi mately 20 to 25 percent. See Ta lbert, supra note 1, at 2. The conception rate is even lower in the first several months after use of oral contraception ceases. See id.
One commentator argued that reproduction is an activity that "most persons in society can perform without difficulty" because "only 7.9% of the population of persons of reproduc tive age have difficulty reproducing." Morgan, supra note 95, at 981 & n. 123. Drawing such a conclusion from this statistic ignores the statistic's critical qualifier, "of reproductive age." Morgan's conclusion is unpersuasive because it fails to consider the fact that many people are either too young or too old to reproduce. [Vo l. 96:724 tive systems in order to achieve conception. "121 The continual processes which allow reproduction include sperm production, ovu lation, and various hormonal changes.
This Note contends that reproduction begins with conception and culminates at birth. These are the defining elements of the ac tivity, for unless both conception and birth occur, there can be no reproduction, and until the process of reproduction begins, there can be no conception and no birth. Several courts agree that this is the correct conceptualization.122 A broader notion of reproduction is inappropriate because instead of truly satisfying the test, it simply begs the question. Redefining reproduction in terms of sperm pro duction, ovulation, and other related processes merely identifies po tential areas of impairment, not major life activities. For example, in order for infrequent ovulation or impaired sperm production, which are ·undeniably "impairments " under the EEOC defini tion,123 to qualify as disabilities, they must still limit a major life activity.124 Infrequent ovulation and impaired sperm production limit no major life activities, however -unless either reproduction is a major life activity or sperm production and ovulation by them selves are major life activities.
Using such a broad definition, reproduction might indeed satisfy the frequency components. Sperm production does occur through out the day, every day. The courts adopting this definition, how ever, ignore the equally important universality element, which undermines their position. Sperm production and ovulation fail the universality component of the test because all of these reproductive functions are unique to either males or females. Not one of the sixteen previously recognized major life activities are unique to one sex; on the contrary, every previously recognized major life activity is performed by everyone, or nearly everyone, regardless of sex.125 It makes no sense to consider something a major life activity if half the population, or more, is precluded from ever performing it.126 126. Critics may argue that sperm production and ovulation are parallel processes which might be labeled "gamete production." Grouping these processes under one label is not only inappropriate, but also does not change the fact that neither process passes the universality test.
Furthermore, a broad definition of reproduction is incompatible with the ADA's concept of a major life activity vis-a-vis its role in the ADA's three-part definition of disability. If the definition of reproduction were so broad as to include all the processes that lead to conception and childbirth, then to classify reproduction as a ma jor life activity would be to classify ovulation and sperm production by themselves as major life activities. Such a result would mean that a finding of disability would follow from the existence of only the first component of the three-component disability test -a re sult that would destroy the distinction between impairments and major life activities that the statute clearly seeks to preserve.12 1
It is true, of course, that some courts have found these processes to constitute major life activities.128 Their analysis, however, lacks credibility because they have made this determination after consid ering only the "impairment" component of the definition of disabil ity, rather than considering "impairment" as only one of three necessary components.129
The fact that male and female reproductive processes require entirely different organs, yield different products (eggs or sperm), and are unique and exclusive to half the population makes them different from every other previously recognized major life' activity. Major life activities such as seeing, breathing, and speaking are performed in exactly the same manner and through the use of the same body parts by each sex. Such a significant and obvious difference between gamete production and all other major life activities raises serious ques tions as to the validity of such a reclassification. No previously recognized major life activity attempts to group under one label activities with such significant distinctions.
Nonetheless, even if male and female reproductive processes were grouped together, gamete production would still fail the universality test. At best, males and females as a group only engage in gamete production for a limited part of their lives. Neither males nor females engage in such processes before puberty, and although men may produce sperm for the dura tion of their lives, women undergo menopause, leaving them unable to engage in these repro ductive processes for half of their lives or more. Even if one were to accept the idea of "gamete production" as an activity not unique to either sex, a significant number of people will be unable to perform it {because of their age), despite the fact that no impairment pre vents performance. As a result, even gamete production cannot be classified as an activity performed by nearly all people. No other major life activity is possible for only a limited period during an individual's lifetime. Some courts that have found reproduction to be a major life activity have rejected the frequency components offered in the Frequency-Universality Te st, finding that neither the ADA nor its regulations overtly establish such criteria.130 They hold that the fre quency components too narrowly define "major life activity." In stead, they extend the definition of "major life activity" to include activities that are less frequent but "momentous" or a "fundamen tal aspect[ ] of human life."131 The criticism these courts direct to ward the frequency components of the Frequency-Universality Te st, however, is more effectively directed at their own notion of a major life activity. It is true that nowhere in the ADA or its interpretive guidelines did Congress or the EEOC explicitly instruct that microfrequency and macrofrequency are necessary elements of a major life activity. It is equally true, however, that nowhere in the ADA or its interpretive guidelines is there any hint that infrequent but "momentous" or "significant" events constitute major life activ ities either. In fact, the only guidance Congress and the EEOC have provided -the illustrative lists and the little-difficulty stan dard132 -suggests that infrequent but momentous events are not major life activities. Not a single one of the illustrative major life activities can be described as infrequent but momentous. On the other hand, every illustrative major life activity approved by Con gress or the EEOC is performed microfrequently -repeatedly throughout the day or for a large portion of the day -and macrofrequently -every day or nearly every day. The inclusion of a "momentous·event" category in the notion of a "major life activ ity" is nothing more than a judicial expansion of the law. Not only is momentousness a criterion inconsistent with every major life ac- 132. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93 tivity previously recognized by Congress or the EEOC, it is also hopelessly vague as a standard to apply to specific activities.133
IV. OTHER S TATUTES P ROVIDE M ORE A PPROPRIATE M EANS OF RELIEF
Any attempt to classify reproduction as a major life activity under the ADA strains the language of the Act and distorts its meaning. Not only is such a strain inappropriate, but it is also un necessary. Courts that have classified purely reproductive disorders as disabilities under the ADA undoubtedly were motivated by the laudable desire to allow relief for plaintiffs suffering discrimination relating to a reproductive disorder. As this Part elaborates, how ever, another means of relief for victims of reproductive discrimina tion already exists in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).134
The PDA, a 1978 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides a more appropriate avenue for remedying dis crimination against women with reproductive disorders. The PDA declares that discrimination "because of or on the basis of preg nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" constitutes sex based discrimination in violation of Title 'VII.135 The Supreme Court has held that discrimination based on the potential for preg nancy also constitutes sex discrimination under the PDA.136 Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, holding specifically that purely reproductive disorders constitute "related medical con ditions" under the language of the PDA.137
Moreover, interpreting the PDA to cover discrimination against women with reproductive disorders most clearly effectuates its pur pose. In enacting the PDA, Congress sought to prohibit discrimina-133. One commentator advances the similarly flawed argument that reproduction must be a major life activity because it has been deemed a fundamental right. See Morgan, supra note 95, at 982 ("Refusing to recognize reproduction as a major life activity is difficult to reconcile with the courts' long history of recognizing reproduction as a fundamental right."). The characterization of an activity as a fundamental right has no relationship whatsoever to whether the activity meets the ADA definition of a major life activity. Morgan's argument is unpersuasive for the same reasons that the "momentousness" argument is unpersuasive. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32. (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that infertility is not a "related medical condition" because it pre vents conception, unlike pregnancy and childbirth which occur after conception).
[Vol. 96:724 tion on the basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant.138 One would expect claims of discrimination against infertile women to arise most often when infertile women seek treatment for their con dition. Discriminating against a female employee for seeking to correct an infertility problem is discriminating against that em ployee for trying to become pregnant.139 Courts are unlikely to in terpret the PDA in a way that would allow this type of discrimination.1 4 0 Fi nally, the remedies and procedures available under the PDA are the same as those available under the ADA.1 4 1 As a result, a plaintiff who chooses to pursue relief under the PDA rather than the ADA forfeits nothing in terms of potential remedies and in stead bases her demand for relief upon a statute more appropriately tailored to remedying reproductive discrimination.
CONCLUSION
In defining disability, the ADA limits its scope to those impair ments which substantially limit a maj or life activity. Congress and the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the Act have de fined impairments expressly to include reproductive disorders. Re production, however, is conspicuously absent from the lists of illustrative maj or life activities. Although some members of Con- tion disability is purely subjective. The defendant employer need not even know whether the plaintiff actually has the condition, or whether the condition he regards the plaintiff as having would qualify as a disability under the ADA's first definition. So long as the employer "re gards" the employee as disabled, the employee meets the ADA's third definition. According to EEOC regulations, an individual is "disabled" under the ADA's third definition of disabil ity when that individual: "(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substan tially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity (e.g., an employer] as constituting such limitation; (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment." 29 C.F.R. gress apparently believed ADA coverage of asyi;nptomatic HIV positive individuals to be based on limitations in reproduction, a more thorough analysis of the reasons why the ADA covers asymp tomatic individuals with HIV reveals that limitations on reproduc tive capabilities do not form the basis for ADA coverage. Further, the legislative history of the ADA provides no support for the prop osition that purely reproductive disorders should be covered under the ADA.
Without a clear statutory basis or other Congressional mandate to include reproduction as a major life activity, substantial consider ation ought to be given to the reasons Congress may have excluded reproduction from the list of illustrative major life activities. First, Congress intended to limit the definition of disability rather than provide coverage to every individual with an impairment.142 Sec ond, reproduction is qualitatively different from the major life ac tivities expressly acknowledged by Congress and the administrative agencies in charge of enforcing the Act.143
All of the major life activities previously recognized by Con gress and the EEOC possess three characteristics: microfrequency, macrofrequency, and universality. These three characteristics should be recognized explicitly as necessary components of a major life activity under the ADA. Because reproduction lacks all three of these elements, it would distort the meaning of the ADA to classify reproduction as a major life activity. Expanding the scope of "major life activities" to include reproduction would be a con scious expansion of the law by the courts. Such a judicial expansion of the scope of major life activities would violate both the language of the ADA and congressional intent.
